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I. Introduction 
It has been more than three decades since China started to transform its economy 
institutionally and structurally. The economic transformation has stimulated rapid 
economic growth in both GDP and personal incomes. From 1978 to 2007 the annual 
growth of GDP averaged close to 10 percent and that of household per capita income 
more than 7 percent. The rate of economic growth was even more impressive in later 
years, including the period under study in this chapter.  From 2002 to 2007 annual 
growth of GDP was 11.6 percent, and of rural and urban household income per capita 
6.8 and 9.6 percent, respectively.1 
Although the reforms were successful in promoting GDP growth, by the early 
2000s concerns about rising disparities and sustainability prompted the government to 
announce a new development strategy emphasizing sustainable, harmonious growth.  
A new policy program, referred to as the “vision of scientific development” (kexue 
fazhanguan), or “the Hu-Wen new policies” (Hu-Wen xin zheng), aimed to promote 
development in urban and rural areas, reduce regional disparities, narrow income 
inequalities, and establish a social protection network with full coverage for all people.  
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, the new policy program contained a series of 
pro-rural measures. These included the elimination of the agricultural taxes, which 
had been in place for almost sixty years, and the adoption of new farm subsidies, e.g., 
for grain production, purchase of agricultural inputs, and farm insurance (Lin and 
Wong 2012).2 By the end of 2007 Chinese rural households were no longer paying 
agricultural taxes, and total agricultural production subsidies from the central 
government exceeded 50 billion yuan (Ministry of Agriculture 2007; Lin and Wong 
2012).  
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The pro-rural policies also addressed social welfare concerns.  In the early 2000s 
the government initiated programs that reduced the costs of education in poor areas, 
and in 2006-7 the central government announced a policy of free education in rural 
areas through junior middle school, eliminating all fees for the first nine years of 
education (see Chapter 4).  During the same time frame, subsidized rural cooperative 
health care and a rural medical care relief fund were put in place. Although these 
measures did not have an immediate impact on household earnings, they reduced 
household outlays on education and health and encouraged schooling, which in the 
long term can enhance incomes.   
The rural minimum living guarantee (zuidi shenghuo baozheng, or dibao) 
program was another important component of the rural policy program.  The number 
of rural people supported by dibao increased enormously, from 4 million in 2002 to 
36 million in 2007. On average, in 2007 each individual received about 480 yuan, 
equivalent to 60 percent of the official poverty line in rural areas (Ministry of Civil 
Affairs 2007; see Chapters 1 and 5).    
During this period the Chinese government also maintained or expanded policies 
benefiting lower-income urban households, such as the urban dibao program and the 
provision of low-cost housing.  Some steps were also taken to improve the situation 
of poor rural-to-urban migrants, e.g., regulations issued in 2003 regarding the 
treatment of vagrants and beggars, which provided social services to poor individuals 
regardless of their place of origin (Li 2004; State Council 2003).  The impact of such 
programs on urban inequality, however, has been mixed.  Analyses of the urban 
dibao program, for example, reveal that it played an important role in alleviating 
urban poverty, but did not substantially reduce urban income inequality (Li and Yang 
2009; Ravallion et al. 2006).  Moreover, the number of urban households benefiting 
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from the program did not increase significantly during the period under study here.  
China’s economic growth is closely related to urbanization. The share of the 
urban population in China’s total population has increased almost one percentage 
point each year since 1990. By the end of 2007, the share of the urban population in 
the total population was 45 percent. Rural-to-urban migration has been an important 
part of the urbanization process. According to the Second National Agricultural 
Census, in 2006 the number of rural-urban migrant workers who were employed in 
urban areas for more than six months per year was about 132 million. Although rural 
migration can contribute to the growth of household income in rural areas, it can also 
create competition in urban labor markets that potentially affects urban incomes and 
inequality as well.   
In China rural-urban and regional divisions in terms of economic and social 
development are substantial. These spatial divisions were significant during the 
planning period (Démurger et al. 2002) and have persisted into the reform era. 
Concerns about the urban-rural income gap prompted many of the rural support 
policies outlined above. Similarly, differential economic growth between coastal and 
inland regions led the Chinese government to adopt regional balancing policies. In 
1999 the central government implemented the western development strategy (xibu 
dakaifa zhanlüe) and increased investment in infrastructure and fiscal transfers to 
western provinces (Fang, Zhang, and Li 2007). This was followed by further 
programs supporting other lagging regions, such as the revival the Northeast strategy 
(zhenxing dongbei) in 2003 and the rise of the central region (zhongbu jueqi) scheme 
aimed at the central provinces in 2006 (Yao 2009; Chung, Lai, and Joo 2009).  Such 
policies could have an impact on regional income disparities.   
Using data from the 2002 and 2007 waves of the China Household Income 
 
 
90
Project (CHIP) survey, in this chapter we measure and analyze income inequality and 
poverty during the 2002-2007 period.  Here we report overall nationwide patterns 
and trends.  The findings reported in this chapter establish the groundwork for the 
later chapters in this volume, which provide in-depth analyses of particular sectors, 
programs and policies.   
We begin in the next section with a brief review of the main findings in the recent 
literature on changes in China’s income inequality and summarize the results from the 
previous volume based on the 2002 CHIP survey (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008).  
In Section III we explain key features of our data.  In Section IV we present our 
central findings regarding levels and trends in China’s national income inequality, and 
we also examine the sources of income.  Despite substantial growth in mean incomes 
between 2002 and 2007, and despite the various policies adopted to promote 
harmonious growth, during this period nationwide inequality continued an upward 
trend.  This conclusion is robust to choice of income definition, weights, and 
inequality index, and to the treatment of migrants.   
A growing number of rural people have moved to the cities, but they are not fully 
captured in the official National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) household surveys.  This 
leads to a potential bias in estimations of income growth and inequality among 
Chinese households. Other chapters in this volume examine the income and inequality 
of the rural and formal urban populations, but not that of rural-urban migrants.  
Therefore, in this chapter we include a separate section on income and inequality 
among rural-urban migrants.  Following the method used by the NBS to identify the 
location of residence, we define migrants as those individuals who have a rural 
household registration but who reside in a city on a long-term, stable basis.  
Short-term, temporary migrants are treated as members of their rural households of 
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origin and are included in the rural survey dataset (see further discussion in Chapter 1 
and Appendix II).   
Our analysis shows that between 2002 and 2007 the incomes of long-term, stable 
rural-urban migrants grew rapidly, and inequality among migrants declined.  
Including migrants in our calculations of inequality reduces inequality within the 
urban areas, but due to the relatively low share of this group in the national population, 
it does not substantially alter the national levels of inequality.  Temporary and 
short-term migration, however, contributed to income growth of rural households and 
thus likely moderated the income gap between the urban and rural areas (see also 
Chapter 6 in this volume).       
The increase in China’s national inequality between 2002 and 2007 reflects 
changes in the spatial structure of China’s income distribution, as discussed in 
Sections VI and VII.  The continued widening of the urban-rural income gap is of 
particular concern because the urban-rural divide remains a major source of inequality.  
Analysis of inequality among geographic regions reveals that regional income 
differentials in fact contribute a relatively small share of national inequality.  The 
overwhelming majority of national inequality is associated with inequality within 
regions, including urban-rural gaps within regions. 
Finally, in Section VIII we examine nationwide trends in poverty (later chapters 
in this volume will examine rural and urban poverty separately).  Between 2002 and 
2007 national poverty, as measured using an absolute poverty line, continued an 
ongoing decline and reached historically low levels.  Relative poverty, however, 
remained unchanged.  We comment on these and other findings in a concluding 
section.   
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II. Main Findings of Previous Studies 
The rise in income inequality in China during the reform era has been widely 
documented.  Past studies have found that nationwide inequality rose rapidly 
between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s but then tapered off from the mid-1990s 
through the early 2000s.  Estimates by Ravallion and Chen (2007) and the World 
Bank (2009a) show income inequality rising from the late 1980s through 1994, 
dipping a bit in the late 1990s, and then edging upward thereafter, so that by the early 
2000s inequality was only slightly higher than it was in the mid-1990s.  Analyses 
based on the 1995 and 2002 CHIP surveys similarly report that inequality remained 
more or less unchanged between 1995 and 2002 (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008a; 
Khan and Riskin 2008). 
Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008a) identify several equalizing processes that 
emerged in the late 1990s that might explain these trends.  They include the spread 
of wage employment in the rural areas, the catching up of lower-income provinces 
with higher-income provinces in some regions, shared macroeconomic growth, and, 
within urban areas, broader implementation of the urban housing reforms.   
The emergence of equalizing processes from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
raises the possibility that inequality in China may have turned the corner.  Findings 
based on the 2007 CHIP data reported below, however, show that after 2002 
inequality in China resumed its upward trajectory.  The analysis in this and later 
chapters finds evidence that some equalizing processes continued to operate during 
this period, but they were insufficient to offset the stronger dis-equalizing forces. 
Spatial income differentials figure large in the literature on inequality in China. 
The widening gap between urban and rural incomes is consistently cited as an 
important factor underlying national inequality (e.g., Sicular et al. 2010; Ravallion 
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and Chen 2007; World Bank 2009a; Kanbur and Zhang 2009).  This finding is robust 
across numerous studies using different measures of income and inequality.  
Regional income differences between the eastern, central, and western regions have 
also received attention, although several recent studies conclude that regional 
differences are not as important as within-region and rural-urban inequality (Yao 2009; 
Fan, Kanbur, and Zhang 2010; Wan 2007).  Below we explore rural-urban and 
regional income differentials using the 2007 CHIP data; our findings are generally 
consistent with these other studies. 
China has an enviable record of poverty reduction (World Bank 2009a; Ravallion 
and Chen 2007; Chen and Ravallion 2008).  Although various studies differ in their 
choices of poverty measures and poverty lines, they agree on broad trends over time.  
During the early and mid-1990s poverty in China declined substantially, but then in 
the late 1990s to the early 2000s the downward trend stalled (World Bank 2009a; 
Ravallion and Chen 2007; Minoiu and Reddy 2008). Some recent studies suggest that 
after 2001 poverty reduction once again accelerated (World Bank 2009a).  Our 
estimates of absolute poverty show progress in terms of poverty reduction from 2002 
through 2007.   
Most of the literature on poverty in China measures poverty using an absolute 
poverty line based on the cost of basic food and non-food consumption needs.  As 
countries develop, deprivation is associated more with relative than with absolute 
living standards.  In view of China’s transformation from a low- to a middle-income 
country, we extend the analysis of poverty and measure relative poverty.  By such a 
measure, China’s poverty record in recent years is less encouraging. 
Poverty, like inequality, has spatial dimensions: it is primarily rural, and its 
incidence is higher in western China than elsewhere (World Bank 2009a; Ravallion 
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and Chen 2007).  As the overall level of poverty has declined, however, the 
remaining poor have become increasingly dispersed.  The spatial pattern of poverty 
is important in terms of the design of poverty alleviation programs, which in China 
have relied heavily on geographic targeting (World Bank 2009a).  Therefore, in the 
analysis below we also investigate the regional aspects of poverty. 
 
III. Data and Sample Weights 
The data used in this chapter come from the last two waves of the CHIP household 
surveys, in 2002 and 2007. The surveys cover three types of households: urban 
households, rural households, and rural-urban migrant households. The samples of 
urban households and rural households are subsamples of the large NBS urban and 
rural household survey samples. In 2002, the NBS samples included 680,000 
households in rural areas and 40,000 households in urban areas.3 In 2007, the urban 
sample increased to 59,000 households, but the size of the rural sample remained 
more or less unchanged.4  
The 2002 wave of the CHIP rural survey selected 9,200 households from the 
NBS rural household survey. These households contain 37,969 individuals from 120 
counties of twenty-two provinces. Provinces covered by the CHIP sample were 
selected so as to obtain representation of China’s major regions.  For the rural 
sample, the provinces include Beijing (representing the large metropolitan cities with 
provincial administrative status); Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, and 
Guangdong (representing the eastern region); Shanxi, Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, 
Hubei, and Hunan (representing the central region); and Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Xinjiang, and Gansu (representing the western 
region).5 The provincial statistical bureaus were given autonomy to decide the 
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number of counties in the CHIP subsample, but they were required to select counties 
and villages representative of different income levels. The 2002 urban survey selected 
6,835 households. These households contain 20,632 individuals surveyed in seventy 
cities in eleven of the twenty-two provinces of the rural survey, including Beijing 
(large municipality); Liaoning, Jiangsu, Guangdong (eastern); Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, 
Hubei (central); and Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu (western). These 
households are largely formal urban residents with local household registration 
(hukou).  A detailed description of the 2002 survey can be found in Li et al. (2008). 
The 2002 rural and urban household questionnaires were designed for the purpose 
of deriving household income that could be comparable internationally. The 
households were asked questions regarding wage and other income components for 
each of their working members, and regarding income from family businesses. In 
order to estimate the imputed rent of owner-occupied private housing, several 
housing-related questions were included, such as the self-estimated market value and 
the market rent of owner-occupied housing.  
The 2002 CHIP survey also included a separate, add-on sample of 2,000 
rural-urban migrant households, which were selected from the capital city plus one 
middle-sized city in each province that is represented in the CHIP urban survey. Two 
hundred households were selected from each of the provinces in the eastern and 
central regions and 150 households from each of the provinces in the western region. 
Within each province, 100 households were allocated to the capital city and the 
remainder to other cities. Within the cities, rural-urban migrant households were 
selected from residential communities, hence the migrant workers living in 
construction sites and factories were excluded from the sample. Since in our analyses 
we only use the subsample of migrants who are long-term, stable residents of cities,  
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this aspect of the 2002 sample selection is not overly problematic. The migrant 
questionnaires include questions regarding wage, business income, consumption, and 
job characteristics of individual members and households.  
The 2007 CHIP surveys of rural and urban households were conducted in sixteen 
provinces, including Beijing, and Shanghai (representing the large metropolitan cities 
with provincial administrative status); Fujian, Guangdong, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and 
Zhejiang (eastern); Anhui, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, and Shanxi (central); and Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu (western). The survey of rural-urban migrant households 
covered nine of the above sixteen provinces. The CHIP surveys cover 13,000 rural 
households, 10,000 urban local households, and 5,000 rural-urban migrant households. 
As in the 2002 surveys, the 2007 surveys of rural households and urban local 
households took subsamples from the large NBS sample, whereas the rural-urban 
migrant survey was conducted separately. For the 2007 migrant survey, sampling was 
carried out using a geographical grid.  Cells from the grid were chosen randomly; 
within each selected cell, the survey team identified all employers and workplaces and 
drew up a list of all their migrant employees.  Migrants were then selected randomly 
from this list of employees.  The CHIP migrant survey sample is composed of the 
selected migrants and their household members.  This approach is different from that 
used to construct the 2002 migrant sample.  The change in the sampling method for 
migrants may affect comparisons across the two years; however, to some extent the 
consequences are mitigated by the fact that in our analysis we only include those 
migrants who are long-term, stable residents, and also by the use of population 
weights when incorporating the migrant subsamples into our urban and national 
calculations.  More details about the 2007 survey are provided in Chapter 1 and 
Appendix I of this volume.  
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The questionnaires for the 2007 surveys include many but not all of the same 
questions as the 2002 surveys. However, new questions regarding migration status 
and behavior were added for the purpose of migration analysis.  
The CHIP survey samples have several characteristics that may lead to an 
estimation bias if the samples are used without population-based sample weights.  A 
detailed discussion of weights can be found in Appendix II of this volume and in Li et 
al. (2008).  The key issues are (a) the CHIP sample was designed to be representative 
of four distinct regions (large municipalities with provincial status, eastern China, 
central China, and western China),6 (b) not all provinces are included in the samples, 
and provincial coverage changed between 2002 and 2007, (c) provincial sample sizes 
are not proportional to their populations, and (d) the urban, rural, and migrant sample 
sizes are not proportional to their populations.  In view of these features, when 
subsamples are combined among groups and regions, and for comparison over time, 
population weights are needed to make the samples representative and comparable 
across years.  
As discussed in Appendix II of this volume, two alternative approaches are 
recommended for sample weights.  The first is to use two-level weights based on the 
population shares of each group (urban, rural, and where relevant migrant) within 
each region.  The second is to use three-level weights based on the population shares 
of each group (urban, rural, and where relevant migrant) within each province and 
region.  In general, we use three-level weights, but to show the sensitivity of the 
estimation results to the weighting methods, in Table 2A.1 we present estimates of   
national incomes and inequality calculated using alternative weights.   
With respect to income, our preferred measure is net disposable household per 
capita income.  The NBS calculates an estimate of net disposable household income 
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that is published in the official sources and is provided in the CHIP datasets.  As 
discussed elsewhere (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008a; Khan and Riskin 1998), the 
NBS calculation of net disposable income omits certain components of income.  For 
this reason, we prefer an alternative calculation of income based on that outlined in 
Khan et al. (1992) and Khan and Riskin (1998), but adapted in light of recent shifts in 
the structure of income and data availability.  Specifically, we calculate income as 
NBS income, plus imputed subsidies on subsidized rental housing, plus the imputed 
value of rental income on owner-occupied housing.  The CHIP surveys contain 
information on estimated market rents and market housing values that are used to 
calculate these additional income components.  For imputed rental income of 
owner-occupied housing, we use the estimates explained in Chapter 3 of this volume.7  
Below we refer to this alternative, broader measure of income as “CHIP income.”  
For purposes of comparison over time, we deflate the 2007 incomes using the 
consumer price indexes published by the NBS to obtain values in constant 2002 prices.  
For national calculations, we use the average national consumer price index.  For 
separate analyses of the urban and rural areas, we use the separate urban and rural 
consumer price indexes (the urban consumer price index is used for rural-urban 
migrants).  Between 2002 and 2007 the consumer price indexes show that on 
average nationwide consumer prices rose by 13.9 percent; in the urban areas 
consumer prices rose by 12.3 percent and in the rural areas by 16.4 percent.8    
Several studies note that differences in costs of living among regions and 
provinces can lead to an overstatement of real inequality (Brandt and Holz 2006; 
Sicular et al. 2010).  To obtain income that is comparable among regions in terms of 
purchasing power parity (PPP), we use the PPP-adjusted deflator from Brandt and 
Holz (2006) to correct for differences in living costs between urban and rural areas 
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and among provinces.  Brandt and Holz (2006) provide the PPP deflators for 2002 
that we apply to the 2002 CHIP data.  For 2007 we update the Brandt and Holz PPP 
deflators using the official consumer price indexes for urban and rural areas by 
province, as published by the NBS.  
 
IV. National Household Income Inequality: Main Findings 
Table 2.1 shows mean national household per capita income and income inequality 
calculated using three commonly used inequality indices, the Gini coefficient and two 
Theil indices.  Although less common than the Gini, the Theil indices have desirable 
properties and, unlike the Gini, can be decomposed to analyze inequality between and 
within groups, which is useful for us to examine the role of urban-rural inequality.9 
We also show the Lorenz curve, which gives a graphical depiction of inequality and is 
closely related to the Gini.10  
Our preferred estimates are calculated using the CHIP definition of income, 
including migrants, and with three-level population weights (urban/rural/migrant 
group x region x province).  As our preferences may not be universally shared, and 
for ease of comparison with other studies, we also present estimates calculated using 
the NBS definition of income, and excluding migrants.  Appendix Table 2A.1 gives 
estimates calculated using alternative weighting methods, and Appendix Table 2A.2 
gives estimates calculated using alternative estimates of imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing. 
Table 2.1 about here 
On average, incomes increased markedly between 2002 and 2007.  Regardless 
of the income definition, treatment of migrants, or choice of weights, mean income 
increased more than 70 percent during the five years (calculated using constant 2002 
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prices), implying an average annual growth in income of 12 to 13 percent.  Income 
growth was more rapid for the CHIP definition of income than for the NBS definition, 
reflecting growth in imputed rents on owner-occupied housing and the expansion of 
urban homeownership, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this volume. The inclusion of 
migrants modestly increases the mean income levels in 2007, and yields more rapid 
growth in income. 
On balance, growth in mean income should reduce inequality: if mean income 
increases while the distribution of income around the mean stays unchanged, then 
measured inequality will decline.  Despite the substantial growth in national mean 
income, however, inequality in China increased. 
From 2002 to 2007 China’s Gini coefficient rose by 5.0 to 5.5 percent.  For our 
preferred calculation (CHIP income, including migrants), the Gini rose by 5.0 percent, 
from 0.46 in 2002 to 0.48 in 2007.  This level of inequality is moderately high by 
international standards. 
Increases in the Theil measures of inequality were larger, ranging from 9.5 
percent for G(1) to nearly 14.6 percent for G(0).  Differences in inequality trends 
among the three measures reflect that each measure emphasizes different sections of 
the income distribution.  The Gini emphasizes income differences in the middle of 
the distribution, the GE(0) places more weight on income differences in the lower tail 
of the distribution, and the GE(1) places even weight on income differences across the 
income distribution.   
A graph of the Lorenz curves reveals the pattern of change in income distribution 
that underlies the increases in these inequality indices (Figure 2.1).   The Lorenz 
curve for 2007 is everywhere lower than that for 2002, which is consistent with an 
increase in inequality as measured by the inequality indices in Table 2.1.   
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Figure 2.1 about here 
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of income across income decile groups, ordered 
from the poorest 10 percent to the richest 10 percent.  The height of the light grey 
bars gives mean income by decile in 2002, and the height of the dark grey bars gives 
mean income by decile in 2007 (in constant 2002 prices).  The black line shows the 
percentage increase in income between 2002 and 2007 (in constant prices) for each 
decile. 
Figure 2.2 about there 
It is clear from Figure 2.2 that income increased for all decile groups, but the 
increase was smaller for the poorer deciles than for the richer deciles. The income of 
the bottom decile increased by 401 yuan, or 45 percent (in constant 2002 prices).  
This is a substantial increase, but in both absolute and relative terms it lags far behind 
that of the higher income groups.  The income of the top decile, for example, 
increased by more than 14,000 yuan, or 86 percent.   
Do these patterns of inequality reflect changes in the composition of income?  
Clues about the role of different income sources can be found in Table 2.2, which 
shows the income shares, Gini concentration ratios, and contributions to overall 
inequality of each component of per capita income.  The contributions to inequality 
are calculated using the standard inequality decomposition by factor components 
(Shorrocks 1982).   
Table 2.2 about here 
Looking first at urban incomes, one can see that the concentration ratio of urban 
household incomes is much higher than the Gini of the total income distribution, 
implying that on balance urban income was concentrated among higher-income 
groups. This was especially true for urban income from assets and imputed rent on 
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owner-occupied housing.  More generally, the numbers in Table 2.2 reveal the 
emergence of private property as a new and increasingly important source of 
inequality.  Nationally, including both rural and migrant households, the contribution 
of assets and imputed rent to total inequality rose from 8 percent in 2002 to 13 percent 
in 2007.  If calculated using alternative estimates of imputed rent, the contribution of 
assets and imputed rent to total inequality rose from 10 to 19 percent.11 
The negative contribution of urban net transfers (including both government and 
private transfers) is also noteworthy, especially in 2007 when they reduced total 
inequality by 5 percent.  The increasingly equalizing role of urban net transfers 
likely reflects the expansion of government urban welfare programs, such as the urban 
minimum living guarantee program (see Chapter 7) and income taxes (see Chapters 7 
and 10).   
The concentration coefficient of migrant income was similar to that of urban 
income, but owing to the small population and income share of migrants, the overall 
impact on national inequality remained small, although it increased over time.  In 
Section V we discuss the income and inequality of migrants in more detail.     
In contrast, the concentration ratio of rural household income was close to zero in 
2002 and became negative in 2007, implying that rural household income had an 
increasingly equalizing effect on total inequality.  Income from farming was the most 
equalizing source of rural income.  Income from short-term migrant work by rural 
household members was also equalizing, and became more equalizing from 2002 to 
2007.  In-depth analysis of rural incomes and inequality can be found in Chapter 6 in 
this volume. 
Most analyses of inequality in China do not adjust for differences in the cost of 
living among regions.  The cost of living is typically higher in wealthier areas, 
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therefore measured inequality will be overstated as it reflects price differentials as 
well as real differences in purchasing power.  Table 2.3 presents a comparison of 
inequality estimates calculated with and without adjustments for PPP.  In all cases, 
PPP adjustments reduce the measured level of inequality.  For example, adjusting for 
PPP reduces the 2007 Gini coefficient by 12 percent, from 0.483 to 0.423.   
Table 2.3 about here 
Although the measured level of inequality is lower with the PPP adjustment, it 
remains moderately high compared to inequality estimates for other countries (which 
typically are not adjusted for domestic price differentials).  The 2007 Gini coefficient, 
for example, remains well above 0.40 regardless of whether it is calculated using NBS 
or CHIP income.  Moreover, PPP adjustments do not alter the conclusion that 
inequality rose substantially between 2002 and 2007.  In fact, the increase in PPP 
inequality is 8 percent, which is greater than the 5 percent increase for our non-PPP 
estimates. 
 
 V.  Household Income Growth and Inequality of Rural-Urban Migrants 
Because other chapters in this volume do not fully explore incomes and inequality 
among rural-urban migrants, here we include a separate analysis of incomes and 
inequality for this group.  Our analysis draws on data from the CHIP migrant surveys 
carried out in 2002 and 2007.  As mentioned earlier, in our analysis we include only 
long-term, stable rural-urban migrants.  Following the criteria used to classify 
individuals in the NBS household surveys (on which the CHIP surveys are based), we 
define long-term, stable rural-urban migrants as individuals whose origins are in rural 
areas, who have lived in cities for more than six months, and who are either single or 
living with a spouse.  A detailed explanation of the classification criteria can be 
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found in Appendix II to this volume.   
We note that limiting our analysis to long-term, stable migrants reduces the 
potential bias due to differences in the sampling methods used for the 2002 and 2007 
migrant surveys.  As noted above, the 2002 survey does not capture migrants who 
live in temporary or employer-provided housing.  This group is largely composed of 
short-term, temporary migrants, whom we exclude from our long-term, stable migrant 
sample (but who are represented in the rural sample).   
Table 2.4 shows the level and composition of per capita household income of 
migrants.  The mean income of the migrants falls between that of rural and urban 
households.  On average, in 2002 migrant income was 2.6 times rural per capita 
income and 80 percent of urban per capita income.  In 2007 migrant per capita 
income was 3.6 times rural per capita income and 95 percent of urban per capita 
income.  Migrants enjoyed rapid income growth between 2002 and 2007.  On 
average, migrant per capita income in real terms grew at an annual rate of 16 percent, 
exceeding the growth rates of both rural and urban incomes.  Thus, between 2002 
and 2007 migrant income moved closer to that of urban households.  To some extent, 
the higher migrant income growth rate may be due to a self-selection process.  It is 
more likely that low-income migrants choose to return to their original homes, 
whereas high-income migrants choose to remain in the cities on a more long-term and 
stable basis.  
Table 2.4 about here 
Looking at the growth by income component, we find that the wage income of 
migrants grew at a very rapid annual rate of 29 percent, so that its share of total 
migrant income rose from 39 percent in 2002 to 68 percent in 2007.  As shown in 
Table 2.4, almost 90 percent of the total income growth can be attributed to the 
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growth of wage income. Growth of income from household businesses was slow, less 
than 2 percent annually.  The rapid growth of wage income and slow growth of 
family business income shown here to some extent may be due to the change in the 
migrant survey sampling procedure in the two years.  In 2002 the survey was 
conducted in neighborhood communities (shequ) and did not include any migrant 
workers living in construction sites or factory dormitories; in 2007 migrants were 
selected based on employer records of migrant employees.  This could lead to an 
underrepresentation of wage employees and an overrepresentation of self-employed 
migrants in 2002 as compared to 2007.  Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 6 in 
this volume, rapid growth in migrant wage income at this time likely also reflected 
real economic factors, in particular, growth in labor demand and increased reservation 
wages associated with higher farm earnings.  
Due to the increase in the wage share, which is relatively equally distributed, as 
well as growth in incomes overall, income inequality for migrants declined from 2002 
to 2007, as shown by the Lorenz curves in Figure 2.3 and the inequality indices and 
inequality decomposition reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6.  Again, changes between 
2002 and 2007 may in part reflect differences in the sampling procedures.12   
Figure 2.3 about here 
Table 2.5 about here 
Table 2.6 about here 
How does the inclusion of long-term, stable rural-urban migrants affect national 
inequality?  As shown in Table 2.1, the inclusion of these migrants reduces national 
inequality only slightly, by less than 1 percent in both years.  Including migrants 
reduces national inequality because they tend to fall at the center of the income 
distribution, but the reduction is minimal because the population share of long-term, 
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stable migrants is relatively small, although increasing.  According to data from the 
2000 census, this group constituted 2.5 percent of the national population and 7.4 
percent of the urban population.  According to data from the 2005 mini census, this 
group constituted 3.2 percent of the national population and 7.6 percent of the urban 
population (see Appendix II in this volume).   
If we limit our attention to the urban sector, within which the migrants constitute 
a larger share of the population, the inclusion of long-term, stable migrants when 
estimating inequality has a greater impact (Table 2.7).  In 2002 the inclusion of 
migrants reduced urban inequality by 8 percent, and in 2007 by 7 percent.   
Table 2.7 about here 
We note that the difference between inequality calculated with and without 
migrants is not the same as measuring the full impact of migration on inequality.  
Migration can influence income levels of urban and rural households, and likely has 
different impacts in richer and poorer areas.  Fully analyzing the impact of migration 
would require estimating the counterfactual income levels that would have prevailed 
had migration not taken place.  Our calculations use only the actual income levels.   
 
VI. The Structure of Inequality: The Urban-Rural Income Gap 
Analyses of inequality in China typically highlight the widening gap between urban 
and rural household incomes.  Most studies, including those based on earlier rounds 
of the CHIP survey, find that the urban-rural income gap has widened over time and 
that it has contributed to the increase in overall inequality.  
Here we examine changes in the urban-rural income gap between 2002 and 2007.  
In our analysis we use the NBS and CHIP definitions of income.  We note that these 
measures of income do not fully capture implicit subsidies that are disproportionately 
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enjoyed by urban residents, and which if included would widen the urban-rural 
differential (Li and Luo 2010).  We do, however, show estimates adjusted for cost of 
living differences between the urban and rural areas, the correction of which should 
reduce the urban-rural gap (Sicular et al. 2010).  We measure the urban-rural income 
gap as the ratio of average disposable income per capita of households in the urban 
survey, or in the combined urban and migrant surveys, to average net income per 
capita of households in the rural survey. 
We find that the urban-rural income gap continued to widen between 2002 and 
2007 (Table 2.8).  The widening gap is not due to slow growth in rural 
incomes—rural incomes in fact grew rapidly during this period (see Chapter 5)—but 
reflects even faster growth in urban incomes.  Calculated using CHIP income and 
including migrants, the gap increases by about 20 percent from 3.2 to 3.8.   
Table 2.8 about here 
This urban-rural gap is high by international standards.  Available estimates for 
other countries indicate that urban-rural income ratios above 3.0 are rare.  For India, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia the ratio is less than 2.0; for Thailand and the 
Philippines the ratio is 2.2-2.3.  Only for a few countries, such as South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, does the ratio exceed 3.0 (Knight and Song 1999, p. 138; see also World 
Bank 2009b).   
Alternative calculations change the size of the gap, but in all cases the gap widens 
from 2002 to 2007.  Excluding migrants increases the size of the income gap 
somewhat but does not substantially change the trend. The income gap is smaller for 
NBS income than for CHIP income, but in both cases the gap widens over time. 
Adjusting for cost of living differences substantially reduces the magnitude of the 
urban-rural income gap.  Measured using the CHIP PPP-adjusted incomes and 
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including migrants, in 2002 the urban-rural income ratio is 2.2 and in 2007 2.7.  
Again, the urban-rural income ratio widened, increasing by 24 percent between the 
two years. 
The widening urban-rural gap was a factor underlying rising national inequality.  
Table 2.9 presents summary results of a standard inequality decomposition by 
population subgroup using the Theil inequality measures (Shorrocks 1980).13  This 
method disaggregates overall inequality into the contributions of inequality between 
groups and within groups.  In our application, the groups are urban and rural. 
Between-group inequality is the component associated with the urban-rural income 
gap.  
Table 2.9 about here 
We report the results for the two Theil measures of inequality, for both the NBS 
and CHIP income definitions, and without and with migrants.14  In all cases, the 
share of national inequality contributed by between-group inequality increased from 
2002 to 2007.  In 2002 between-group inequality contributed 43 to 46 percent of 
overall inequality.  In 2007 between-group inequality contributed 48 to 52 percent of 
overall inequality, an increase of about 5 percentage points over 2002.  Thus, by 
2007 the urban-rural income gap was associated with roughly half of the national 
inequality in China.  
PPP adjustments reduce the contribution of the urban-rural gap to inequality, but 
exacerbate the increase in the contribution of the urban-rural gap to inequality over 
time (Table 2.10).  For the CHIP measure of income and including migrants, in 2002 
the urban-rural gap contributed 27 to 28 percent of PPP inequality, and by 2007 it had 
risen to about more than 37 percent.   
Table 2.10 about here 
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VII. The Structure of Inequality: Regional Income Differences 
Previous studies note large regional disparities in household incomes in China. 
Analysis of the 2002 CHIP data identified large regional gaps, but with some evidence 
of a regional catch-up (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008).  To investigate regional 
income inequalities between 2002 and 2007, we conduct several computations.  
Following the CHIP sampling approach as well as the official classification of regions, 
in these computations we divide China into four regions: large, provincial-level 
metropolitan cities; the eastern region; the central region; and the western region.  
Table 2.11 shows the relative incomes of the four regions, calculated as a ratio 
using the mean income of the western region as the denominator.  All calculations 
use the CHIP income definition (see Appendix Table 2A.3 for mean incomes per 
capita by region). 
Table 2.11 about here 
We present alternative estimates using unadjusted prices (current year prices, no 
adjustments for regional cost of living differences) and PPP prices (current year prices, 
adjusted for regional cost of living differences).  Costs of living are generally higher 
in more developed regions, so using the PPP prices reduces the income differences 
between the richer and poorer regions.  As shown in Table 2.11, PPP adjustments 
markedly reduce regional income ratios between the large municipalities and the 
western regions and between the eastern and western regions, but they do not 
substantially change the income ratio between the central and western regions.   
Looking at the PPP estimates, we find the largest income ratio to be between the 
large municipalities and the western region.  In 2002 per capita incomes in the large 
municipalities were on average 2.5 times those in the western region; in 2007 the ratio 
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narrowed slightly to 2.4. The ratio between the eastern and western regions was 
smaller but also substantial; that between the central and western regions was fairly 
small.  The regional structure of PPP incomes differs somewhat for the urban, 
migrant, and rural subpopulations.  Regional income differences are largest for rural 
residents. With the exception of large municipalities, rural regional income 
differences narrowed between 2002 and 2007.  The narrowing of rural regional 
income differences might reflect the equalizing effects of migration, or the effects of 
increased returns to farming (see Chapter 5), which could narrow the gap between 
areas with more and less nonagricultural development. 
In urban areas, the regional income gaps all widened. Our estimates indicate that 
income growth of urban households in the western provinces lagged behind that of 
urban households in other regions during the period under study.  Regional income 
differences among urban-based migrant households are small.  Even between the 
large metropolitan cities and the western region, in 2007 the income gap is less than 5 
percent.  There is almost no regional income gap between the eastern and western 
regions, and migrant incomes in central China are 6 percent lower than those in 
western China.  The lack of substantial regional income differences for migrant 
households may reflect the equalizing effect of migration among regions as migrants 
move in response to real differentials in their wages.   
Overall, then, it appears that the widening of the overall regional income gaps in 
China between 2002 and 2007 was largely driven by regional trends among urban 
areas, and between the large municipalities and the rest of China.  Income gaps 
among other regions and groups were relatively stable or narrowed.   
How important is interregional inequality to overall inequality in China?  We 
address this question using standard inequality decomposition analysis of the Theil 
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inequality indices by population subgroup.  Here the relevant groups are the four 
regions.  The contribution of between-group inequality captures the importance of 
regional income differences to overall inequality in China. 
Table 2.12 about here 
Table 2.12 shows estimates of the contribution of between-group (inter-region) 
inequality to inequality for China as a whole (“all”) and for the urban, rural, and 
migrant populations.  The table reports estimates calculated with and without PPP 
adjustments, but our discussion focuses on the PPP estimates, for which incomes are 
more comparable among regions and between urban and rural areas.  
For China as a whole, the share of between-region inequality is relatively low, 
contributing 11 to 12 percent of overall inequality, and with a very slight decrease 
between 2002 and 2007.  In other words, in both years within-region inequality 
accounts for the overwhelming majority of national inequality.   
As one might expect, regional income differences are most important for rural 
inequality, although over time their contribution declined.  In 2002 between-region 
inequality contributed 19 percent and in 2007 less than 14 percent of rural inequality.  
The declining contribution of regional income differentials to rural inequality likely 
reflects the spread of nonagricultural employment opportunities from the eastern areas 
to the central and western areas, as well as the increased migration by rural workers in 
the western region.  
For the formal urban population, between-region differences contributed a 
smaller but growing share of inequality.  These results could reflect continuing or 
perhaps increasing segmentation of the formal urban labor markets, as well as 
regional immobility caused by rapidly rising housing costs in the large metropolitan 
cities.        
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Regional inequality is unimportant among migrant households.  As shown in 
Table 2.12, between-region income inequality as a percentage of total inequality 
among migrants was only about 1 percent in both years.   
The findings in Table 2.12 indicate that national inequality is driven more by 
inequality within regions than by inequality between regions.  Table 2.13, which 
shows the levels of inequality within regions, reveals that within-region inequality has 
remained particularly high in western China.  Within-region inequality increased in 
eastern and central China between 2002 and 2007, but the increase was most 
marked—more than 13 percent—in eastern China.   
Table 2.13 about here 
Inequality within regions is in part a reflection of the large urban-rural income 
gap discussed in the previous section.  In both 2002 and 2007 the urban-rural income 
gap was largest in the western region, about 3 with the PPP adjustments (3.7 to 3.9 
without the PPP adjustments) (Table 2.14).  In the eastern and central regions the 
urban-rural gap was moderate in 2002 but increased substantially between 2002 and 
2007.   
Table 2.14 about here 
In large metropolitan cities the urban-rural income gap shrank between 2002 and 
2007, so that by 2007 the large metropolitan cities had the smallest urban-rural 
income ratio, although it still remained at 2.0.15 This decline may reflect the 
development of rural districts in the large metropolitan cities and their increased urban 
integration.  
Based on the above regional analysis, we conclude that income differences 
between the eastern, central, and western regions are not a major source of nationwide 
inequality.  Within-region income differences are much more important, although 
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less so in the large metropolitan cities than in the eastern, central, and western regions.  
Urban-rural inequality appears to be a contributing factor to the rising inequality in 
the latter three regions. 
 
VIII. Poverty 
During the reform era China has achieved dramatic and ongoing reductions in poverty.  
By 2002 the poverty rate was already quite low, and further poverty reduction became 
more challenging due to several factors, for example, the fact that a high proportion of 
the remaining poverty was geographically dispersed and transient, and also because 
poverty had become less responsive to macroeconomic growth (World Bank 2009a).  
Policies adopted after 2002, such as the minimum living guarantee program, the new 
rural cooperative medical system, and the new rural pension system, have addressed 
some of these factors.     
  Here we examine trends in poverty between 2002 and 2007 so as to understand 
the net effects of policies and growth on poverty.  Studies of poverty have used 
different poverty lines and poverty measures.  We present three alternative estimates 
of poverty, two using absolute poverty lines and one using a relative poverty line.  
For all estimates we use the NBS definition of income, which does not include 
imputed rents on owner-occupied housing.  We exclude imputed rents because the 
poverty lines are set without reference to imputed rents.   
The first absolute poverty line is the international PPP poverty threshold of $1.25 
per day per person, which we convert to yuan using the PPP exchange rate of 3.46 
yuan to the US dollar in 2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2008).  The second absolute 
poverty line is the Chinese government’s official poverty line for rural areas.  In 
view of past criticisms that the Chinese official poverty line is too low, we use the new, 
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higher 2008 official poverty line of 1196 yuan.  We treat both of these poverty lines 
as rural poverty lines and convert them to 2002 and 2007 prices using the NBS 
consumer price index for rural areas.  We set the urban absolute poverty lines equal 
to the rural poverty lines adjusted by the urban-rural cost of living differential (taken 
from Brandt and Holz [2006], and for 2007 updated using the NBS consumer prices 
indexes).   
Relative poverty lines are used fairly often, especially in higher-income countries 
where few households experience absolute deprivation but where individuals at the 
lower end of the income distribution are nevertheless disadvantaged (Osberg 2000; 
Ravallion 1992).  In view of the substantial growth in personal incomes in China in 
recent decades, the concept of relative poverty has become increasingly relevant.  
Following common practice in the literature, we use a relative poverty line equal to 50 
percent of the median income.  The relative poverty lines are set at 50 percent of the 
median income in each of the rural and urban sectors, with long-term, stable migrants 
included in the urban sector.  Table 2.15 shows our poverty lines expressed in current 
prices for each year. 
Table 2.15 about here 
We note that Chapters 5 and 7 in this volume provide more detailed, separate 
analyses of poverty in the rural and urban sectors.  Due to differences in calculation, 
in some cases the levels of poverty reported in these chapters may differ from those 
reported here; however, the overall trends between 2002 and 2007 are similar.   
Our estimates of poverty incidence appear on the top half of Table 2.16.  For 
China as a whole, absolute poverty declined quite substantially between 2002 and 
2007.  Using the PPP $1.25 poverty line, for example, the poverty rate fell from 19 
percent to 8 percent.  Underlying this reduction is a marked decline in rural poverty.  
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Absolute poverty in the formal urban and migrant populations also declined, but was 
already low in 2002.  
Table 2.16 about here 
In contrast, the rate of relative poverty in China as a whole remained more or less 
unchanged at 13 percent.  Stagnant relative poverty rates suggest that households at 
the lower tail of the income distribution were not catching up to the median.  This is 
consistent with our finding of increased inequality, as discussed above.  Relative 
poverty rates are fairly similar for the rural and urban areas, except for migrants 
within the urban areas.  For this group, relative poverty was higher in 2002, but by 
2007 it had declined and was below the relative poverty rates for the rural and formal 
urban populations. 
For all poverty lines, the overwhelming majority of the poor were rural (as shown 
in the bottom half of Table 2.16).  Using absolute poverty measures, more than 95 
percent of the poor were rural.  Using the relative poverty measure, the share of the 
rural poor is lower, although still high at 60+ percent.  Since the urban relative 
poverty lines are equal to 50 percent of the median urban income, and thus higher 
than the rural relative poverty lines, it is not surprising that by this measure a greater 
proportion of the relative poor than the absolute poor are located in the cities.  
Moreover, the share of the relative poor located in the cities increased noticeably 
between 2002 and 2007.   
Poverty rates differed greatly among regions.  As shown in Table 2.17, the 
incidence of absolute poverty in the large municipalities was extremely low; in the 
eastern region it was also relatively low, especially in 2007.  The incidence of 
absolute poverty was higher in the central region and highest in the western region, 
although in both places it declined substantially between 2002 and 2007.  In the 
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western region the rate of absolute poverty, measured using PPP$1.25 per day, 
declined from 32 percent to 15 percent. 
Table 2.17 about here 
Relative poverty was very low in the large municipalities, somewhat low in the 
eastern region, moderate in the central region, and highest in the western region, 
where more than 20 percent of the population fell below the relative poverty line.  
Relative poverty nationwide and in all regions was fairly stable between 2002 and 
2007.  Note that we use the same relative poverty line (50 percent of national median 
income) for all regions. 
By all measures, China’s poor are heavily concentrated in the West.  As shown 
on the bottom half of Table 2.17, half of China’s absolute poor and well over 40 
percent of the relative poor live in the western region.  Moreover, from 2002 to 2007 
the western region’s share of the poor increased.  Less than 1 percent of China’s poor 
live in the large municipalities; 15 to 20 percent live in the eastern region; and about a 
one-third live in the central region.  This regional structure suggests the need for 
focused attention on poverty alleviation in the western and central regions.  
We note further that within all regions poverty was largely rural.  For example, 
in 2007 in all regions, including the western region, rates of absolute poverty 
measured using $1.25 per day for formal urban residents and for long-term migrants 
were all below 1 percent.  In the large municipalities the rate of rural poverty was 
also below 1 percent.  In contrast, in the eastern, central, and western regions the 
rates of rural poverty were 7, 12, and 22 percent, respectively.  Again, this pattern 
has implications for the design of poverty alleviation programs. 
 
IX. Conclusions 
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Despite official policies emphasizing shared growth during the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao 
period, between 2002 and 2007 income inequality in China resumed its upward 
trajectory.  By 2007 the level of inequality in China was moderately high by 
international standards.  With a Gini of approximately 0.5, China was in the same 
ballpark as countries in South and Central America such as Mexico (0.51), Nicaragua 
(0.52), and Peru (0.48), although the level of inequality was still below that of the 
high-inequality countries such as Brazil and Honduras (0.56-0.57).16   
Our analysis reveals some old and some new factors that have contributed to this 
increase in inequality.  An old factor is China’s already large urban-rural income gap.  
The urban-rural gap widened further between 2002 and 2007.  Even after adjusting 
for differences in costs of living, the difference between urban and rural incomes was 
very high by international standards and contributed a substantial share of national 
inequality.   
A new factor contributing to the rising inequality was income from property and 
assets.  By 2007, with the completion of urban housing privatization and the 
development of urban residential real-estate markets, expansion of stock and capital 
markets, growth of private enterprises, and other property rights reforms, income from 
property and assets was beginning to be important.  We find that in 2007 asset and 
property income contributed to both the urban-rural income gap and to the overall 
inequality.  In the future, the importance of asset and property income is likely to 
grow and may continue to drive up inequality in China.  Inequality in these sources 
of income is potentially a hot-button issue, as in China the institutions that shape the 
distribution of assets are not yet transparent or equitable. 
We find evidence that some equalizing factors have also been at work.  
Although they did not fully offset the dis-equalizing factors, they nevertheless 
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moderated the upward trend.  In 2007 urban net transfers began to have a modestly 
equalizing impact.  This category of income includes public transfers, thereby 
suggesting that the expansion of urban social welfare programs has played a positive 
role.  Rapid growth in rural incomes, even if not as rapid as urban income growth, 
also moderated inequality.  From the perspective of inequality, growth in rural 
incomes from farming and short-term migration was especially important.  Some 
dimensions of regional inequality narrowed, for example, between-region rural 
inequality.  These findings suggest that farm support and regional development 
programs may have moderated income disparities, especially in rural China.   
We note that our estimates likely understate the real trends in inequality because 
high-income urban households are increasingly underrepresented in the NBS urban 
survey sample and also because the income of high-income households is likely 
understated.  These are common problems in household surveys in general.  The 
problem is relatively recent in China, and future sampling methods and analytical 
approaches will need to adapt.  A preliminary study by Li and Luo (2011) indicates 
that adjustments to correct for the undercounting of income of high-income urban 
households would increase the Gini coefficient by 8 percentage points in urban areas 
and by 5 percentage points nationwide.  
Between 2002 and 2007 China achieved major gains in poverty reduction.  
Despite new challenges in poverty alleviation, during this period absolute poverty 
continued its downward trend.  Relative poverty, however, did not decline, indicating 
that households at the bottom of the income distribution were not catching up with 
those at the middle or the top.  As China’s economy matures and the number of 
absolute poor shrinks, relative poverty will become an increasingly important social 
indicator. 
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In summary, then, we find that although households in all income groups, sectors, 
and regions continued to enjoy substantial income growth during this period, income 
growth was faster for richer households than for poorer households.  The resulting 
increase in inequality reflected shifts in the structure of the income distribution and 
the emergence of some new underlying mechanisms.  China thus faces ongoing 
challenges in its efforts to promote growth with equity.  In the future, China’s 
distributional policies will need to evolve accordingly.    
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Appendix 
 
Table 2A.1. Income and inequality with alternative weights, 2002 and 2007   
 
  2002  2007 
 urban rural 
national 
(excluding 
migrants) migrant 
national 
(including 
migrants) urban rural 
national 
(excluding 
migrants) migrant 
national 
(including 
migrants) 
No weights 
Mean income 8504 2773 4791 6180 4858 17527 5106 9587 16048 9982 
Gini 0.325 0.364 0.454 0.349 0.450 0.340 0.377 0.480 0.308 0.475 
GE(0)/MLD 0.176 0.225 0.360 0.214 0.355 0.193 0.239 0.407 0.163 0.400 
GE(1) 0.180 0.238 0.355 0.212 0.348 0.196 0.250 0.397 0.173 0.385 
Weight I (urban/rural) 
Mean income 8504 2773 4740 6180 4776 17527 5106 10322 16048 10501 
Gini 0.325 0.364 0.455 0.349 0.453 0.340 0.377 0.476 0.308 0.472 
GE(0)/MLD 0.176 0.225 0.360 0.214 0.357 0.193 0.239 0.405 0.163 0.400 
GE(1) 0.180 0.238 0.356 0.212 0.352 0.196 0.250 0.386 0.173 0.380 
Weight II (urban/rural x region) 
Mean income 8800 2815 4862 6691 4907 16805 4659 9746 16785 9966 
Gini 0.326 0.365 0.458 0.343 0.456 0.337 0.367 0.479 0.295 0.476 
GE(0)/MLD 0.177 0.227 0.366 0.206 0.364 0.190 0.227 0.411 0.149 0.408 
GE(1) 0.180 0.239 0.362 0.203 0.358 0.196 0.236 0.394 0.159 0.388 
Weight III (urban/rural x province x region) 
Mean income 9002 2771 4958 7167 4902 17639 4617 10072 16673 10277 
Gini 0.331 0.354 0.462 0.336 0.460 0.340 0.358 0.487 0.289 0.483 
GE(0)/MLD 0.182 0.213 0.370 0.200 0.368 0.193 0.216 0.424 0.144 0.420 
GE(1) 0.186 0.226 0.370 0.193 0.366 0.199 0.226 0.409 0.154 0.401 
Notes:  
1. Includes all provinces covered by the CHIP. Calculated using current year prices and CHIP income. 
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2. The inequality indexes shown in this table are all scale-invariant.  Consequently, the level of inequality is the same for both the current 
year and constant prices (if deflation is carried out using the same price index for all individuals). 
3. Incomes less than or equal to zero have been dropped for calculation of the GE(0)/MLD and GE(1) inequality indexes (fewer than 30 
observations [individuals] were dropped in 2002 and fewer than 225 in 2007).   
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Table 2A.2. Income and inequality with alternative estimates of imputed rental income 
on owner-occupied housing, 2002 and 2007 
 
2002 2007 
A B A B 
Mean value of urban imputed 
rents on owner-occupied housing 558 860 1945 3229 
Mean value of urban income per 
capita 9002 9303 17638 18922 
Urban-rural income ratio 3.25 3.36 3.82 4.10 
Inequality within urban areas (migrants excluded) 
Gini 0.331 0.327 0.340 0.337 
G(0) 0.182 0.178 0.193 0.190 
G(1) 0.186 0.182 0.199 0.197 
National inequality (migrants included) 
Gini 0.460 0.464 0.483 0.492 
G(0) 0.368 0.375 0.420 0.440 
G(1) 0.366 0.372 0.401 0.416 
Notes: 
1.  Column A contains estimates that use the rate of return approach to calculate rural 
imputed rents and the market rent approach to calculate urban imputed rents.  
Estimates reported elsewhere in this chapter follow this approach.  Column B 
contains alternative estimates that use the rate of return approach for both rural and 
urban areas.  See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the two approaches. 
2.  Three-level weights, CHIP income, and current prices are used in all calculations. 
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Table 2A.3. Mean income per capita by region, 2002 and 2007 (yuan) 
PPP unadjusted 
 2002 2007 
Region urban rural migrant all urban rural migrant all 
Large municipalities 17022 5267 8206 13902 27780 11436 19930 24143
Eastern 10155 3869 8052 6402 21909 6233 17653 13994
Central 6790 2391 5206 3781 13790 4140 12202 7971 
Western 7390 1955 5881 3450 13113 3426 14335 6814 
PPP adjusted 
 2002 2007 
Region urban rural migrant all urban rural migrant all 
Large municipalities 9577 3477 4617 7930 16876 8103 12161 14867
Eastern 6836 4076 4986 5153 15278 6418 11701 10742
Central 5535 2640 4230 3552 11063 4380 9824 7031 
Western 6129 2039 4853 3162 10707 3630 11648 6106 
Notes:  In this table long-term stable migrants are shown separately, and urban 
excludes migrants.  CHIP income definition; calculated using weights (three-level 
weights for all, provincial and regional weights for urban, rural, and migrant); current- 
year prices.  See notes to Table 2.3 regarding PPP adjustments. 
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Figure 2.1 China’s National Lorenz Curves for Household Per Capita Income, 2002 
and 2007 (three-level weights, including migrants, CHIP income definition) 
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Note:  Includes all provinces in both years, CHIP income definition, weighted by 
province, region, and urban/rural.  Calculated using incomes in current-year prices.
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Figure 2.2 Income Levels and Growth by Deciles, 2002 to 2007 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2002 883 1428 1869 2346 2902 3652 4743 6375 8814 16575
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Note:  Includes all provinces covered by the CHIP surveys, CHIP income definition, 
three-level weights (province, region, and urban/rural).  Calculated using incomes in 
constant 2002 prices.
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Figure 2.3 Lorenz Curve of Migrant Per Capita Income, 2002 and 2007  
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Note:  Includes all provinces covered by the migrant surveys, CHIP income 
definition, weighted by province and region using population shares of long-term, 
stable migrants (see Appendix II in this volume).  Calculated using incomes in 
current-year prices.
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Table 2.1. National mean income and inequality, 2002 and 2007 
 
2002 2007 
% change,  
2002 to 2007, 
constant 2002 prices 
 Excluding 
migrants 
Including 
migrants 
Excluding 
migrants 
Including 
migrants 
Excluding 
migrants 
Including 
migrants 
NBS income
Mean income 4467 4530 8932 9165 75.61 77.69
Gini 0.456 0.455 0.481 0.478 5.48 5.05
GE(0) 0.362 0.361 0.414 0.413 14.36 14.40
GE(1) 0.360 0.356 0.398 0.392 10.56 10.11
CHIP income
Mean income 4958 4902 10072 10277 78.42 84.13
Gini 0.462 0.460 0.487 0.483 5.41 5.00
GE(0) 0.370 0.368 0.424 0.420 14.59 14.13
GE(1) 0.370 0.366 0.409 0.401 10.54 9.56
 
Notes: 
1. All estimates are calculated using three-level weights, i.e., urban/rural x 
regional x provincial population shares. 
2. Estimates are calculated using data from all provinces covered by the CHIP 
surveys.  
3. Mean incomes for each year are calculated using current-year prices, and the 
   change between 2002 and 2007 is calculated using constant 2002 prices 
   (deflated using the national average consumer price index).  
4. The inequality indexes shown in this table are all scale-invariant.  
Consequently, the level of inequality is the same for both the current year 
and constant prices (if deflation is carried out using the same price index for 
all individuals). 
5. Here and elsewhere, incomes less than or equal to zero have been dropped 
for calculation of the GE(0) and GE(1) inequality indexes.  In all, fewer 
than 30 observations (individuals) were dropped in 2002 and fewer than 225 
in 2007.   
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Table 2.2. Decomposition of inequality by income sources, 2002 and 2007 
 2002 2007 
 
Concentration 
ratio or Gini 
 
Share 
(%) 
Contribution 
to total 
inequality 
(%) 
Concentration 
ratio or Gini 
 
Share 
(%) 
Contribution 
to total 
inequality 
(%) 
Rural total 0.011 35.87 0.89 -0.101 25.30 -5.30 
Wages from migrant 
jobs -0.066 
 
4.07 -0.59 -0.185 
 
4.47 -1.71 
Other wages 0.156 8.77 2.97 -0.017 5.09 -0.18 
Net farm -0.129 14.23 -3.98 -0.191 9.24 -3.65 
Net from non-farm 
activities 0.206 
 
4.69 2.10 0.126 
 
2.58 0.67 
Assets 0.410 0.24 0.22 0.185 0.66 0.25 
Net transfers 0.071 1.51 0.23 -0.089 1.08 -0.20 
Imputed rent on 
owner-occupied 
housing -0.013 
 
 
2.35 -0.06 -0.108 
 
 
2.17 -0.49 
Urban total 0.717 60.56 94.32 0.684 69.65 98.49 
Wages 0.717 42.19 65.74 0.679 45.78 64.36 
Pensions 0.718 9.89 15.42 0.664 12.58 17.28 
Net from individual 
businesses 0.583 
 
2.01 2.55 0.687 
 
5.39 7.66 
Assets 0.783 0.72 1.23 0.875 1.09 1.98 
Net transfers 0.678 -0.39 -0.57 0.697 -3.75 -5.41 
In-kind subsidies on 
public rental housing 0.742 1.68 2.70 0.645 0.41 0.55 
Imputed rent on 
owner-occupied 
housing 0.739 3.76 6.03 0.714 7.68 11.34 
Other in-kind income 0.808 0.70 1.22 0.778 0.46 0.74 
Migrants total 0.618 3.57 4.79 0.652 5.05 6.81 
Wages 0.554 1.38 1.66 0.626 3.42 4.43 
Net from individual 
businesses 0.652 2.02 2.86 0.695 1.50 2.16 
Assets 0.413 0.01 0.01 0.886 0.03 0.05 
Net transfers 0.719 0.09 0.14 0.885 0.02 0.04 
Imputed rent on 
owner-occupied 
housing 0.763 0.08 0.13 0.796 0.08 0.13 
National total 0.460 100 100 0.483 100 100 
 
Note:  CHIP income definition, including migrants, using three-level weights.  
Includes all provinces covered by the CHIP surveys.  Calculated using incomes 
measured in current-year prices. 
  133
 
Table 2.3. Inequality estimates with and without PPP adjustments, 2002 and 2007 
 
2002 2007 
% change, 2002 to 
2007 
 Without 
PPP 
With 
PPP 
Without 
PPP 
With 
PPP 
Without 
PPP 
With 
PPP 
NBS income
Gini 0.455 0.389 0.478 0.421 5.1 8.2
GE(0)/MLD 0.361 0.265 0.413 0.315 14.4 18.9
GE(1) 0.356 0.258 0.392 0.302 10.1 17.1
CHIP income
Gini 0.460 0.391 0.483 0.423 5.00 8.18
GE(0)/MLD 0.368 0.265 0.420 0.317 14.13 19.62
GE(1) 0.366 0.259 0.401 0.305 9.56 17.76
Notes: 
1. Includes all provinces covered by the CHIP surveys. 
2. Calculated using three-level weights and including migrants.  Incomes are 
in current-year prices. 
3. For PPP estimates, incomes have been adjusted for differences in cost of 
living between urban and rural areas and among provinces using the Brandt 
and Holz (2006) geographic price indexes for 2002 and updated to 2007 
using the provincial rural and urban price indexes published by the NBS.   
4. Incomes less than or equal to zero have been dropped for calculation of the 
GE(0)/MLD and GE(1) inequality indexes.  See notes to Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.4. Level and growth of migrant household per capita income  
 
2002 2007 
Annual income growth 
(constant 2002 prices) 
Wage income 2768 11294 29.4% 
Individual business net 
income 4050 4953 1.7% 
Asset income 13 99 47.3% 
Net transfer income 177 75 -17.7% 
Imputed rent on 
owner-occupied housing 159 252 7.1% 
Total income 7167 16673 15.7% 
Note:  Includes all provinces covered by the migrant surveys, CHIP income 
definition, weighted by province and region using population shares of long-term 
stable migrants (see Appendix II to this volume).  In current-year prices except for 
the real growth rates, which are deflated using the urban consumer price index.     
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Table 2.5. Migrant inequality, 2002 and 2007 
 2002 2007 
% change, 
2002 to 2007 
Gini 0.336 0.289 -14.0% 
GE(0)/MLD 0.200 0.144 -28.0% 
GE(1) 0.193 0.154 -20.2% 
Note:  Includes all provinces covered by the migrant surveys, CHIP income 
definition, weighted by province and region using population shares of long-term 
stable migrants (see Appendix II to this volume).  Calculated using current-year 
prices, but the level of inequality is the same for the current year and constant prices if 
deflation is carried out using the same consumer price index for all individuals. 
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Table 2.6. Decomposition of migrant income inequality by income source, 2002 and 
2007 
 2002 2007 
 
Concentra
-tion ratio 
or Gini 
Share 
(%) 
Contribu- 
tion to total 
inequality 
(%) 
Concentra-
tion ratio 
or Gini 
Share 
(%) 
Contribu- 
tion to total 
inequality 
(%) 
Wage income 0.219 38.63 25.2 0.224 67.74 52.5  
Individual 
business net 
income 0.398 56.5 66.9 0.404 29.71 41.5  
Asset income 0.014 0.18 0.0 0.797 0.59 1.6  
Net transfer 
income 0.537 2.48 4.0 0.805 0.45 1.3  
Imputed rent on 
owner-occupied 
housing 0.597  2.21 3.9 0.590 1.51 3.1  
Total income 0.336 100 100 0.289 100 100 
Note:  Includes all provinces covered by the migrant surveys, CHIP income 
definition, weighted by province and region using population shares of long-term 
stable migrants (see Appendix II to this volume).  Calculated using incomes in 
current-year prices; the level of inequality is the same for the current year and 
constant prices if deflation is carried out using the same consumer price index for all 
individuals. 
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Table 2.7. Urban inequality with and without migrants, 2002 and 2007 
 2002 2007 
 Without With Without With 
Gini 0.331 0.305 0.340 0.317 
GE(0)/MLD 0.182 0.156 0.193 0.169 
GE(1) 0.186 0.157 0.199 0.174 
Note:  Includes all provinces covered by the surveys in both years, CHIP income 
definition, weighted by province and region using the population shares of urban 
locals and long-term stable migrants (see Appendix II to this volume).  Calculated 
using incomes in current-year prices. 
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Table 2.8.  The urban-rural income gap, 2002 and 2007 
 
Mean 
income per 
capita (yuan) 
Average 
annual 
income 
growth  
(constant 
2002 prices) 
Urban-rural 
income ratio 
Urban-rural 
income ratio 
(PPP 
adjusted) 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007
NBS income
Urban, without 
migrants 8078 15469 11.26% 3.16 3.66 2.13  2.61 
Urban, with 
migrants 8005 15537 11.56% 3.13 3.68 2.10  2.60 
Rural 2590 4221 6.96%     
CHIP income
Urban, without 
migrants 9002 17639 11.77% 3.25 3.82 2.21  2.71 
Urban, with 
migrants 8875 17570 12.00% 3.20 3.80 2.17  2.68 
Rural 2771 4618 7.44%     
Note:  Unadjusted current-year prices unless noted otherwise.  Includes all 
provinces covered in the CHIP surveys; calculated using regional and provincial 
population weights. PPP estimates are calculated using incomes that have been 
adjusted for differences in cost of living between urban and rural areas and among 
provinces using the Brandt and Holz (2006) geographic price indexes for 2002, and 
updated to 2007 using the provincial rural and urban price indexes published by the 
NBS.   
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Table 2.9.  Contribution of urban-rural (between-group) inequality to national 
inequality (%) 
 NBS income definition CHIP income definition 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 
Without migrants 
GE(0) 43.1 49.3 45.6 52.0 
GE(1) 44.0 48.0 46.3 50.7 
With migrants 
GE(0) 42.9 49.6 44.5 50.9 
GE(1) 43.5 48.1 44.5 48.5 
Note:  Calculations with migrants include in the urban sector long-term, stable 
migrants from the rural areas in the urban sector. Three-level weights are used.  
Calculated using incomes measured in current-year prices. See Shorrocks (1980) for a 
discussion of the decomposition methodology.  
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Table 2.10.  Contributions of urban-rural (between-group) inequality to national 
inequality, with PPP adjustments (%) 
 NBS income definition CHIP income definition 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 
Without migrants 
GE(0) 25.7 35.4 28.3 38.6 
GE(1) 27.2 35.9 29.9 39.0 
With migrants 
GE(0) 25.2 35.6 27.1 37.5 
GE(1) 26.6 35.8 28.4 37.3 
Note:  The note to Table 2.9 applies.  PPP adjustments for 2002 use the Brandt and 
Holz (2006) price deflators; for 2007 the Brandt and Holz (2006) deflators are 
updated using the NBS provincial urban and rural consumer price indexes. 
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Table 2.11. Regional income gaps, 2002 and 2007 
PPP unadjusted 
 2002 2007 
Region urban rural migrant all urban rural migrant all 
Large municipalities 2.30 2.69 1.40 4.03 2.12 3.34 1.39 3.54 
Eastern 1.37 1.98 1.37 1.86 1.67 1.82 1.23 2.05 
Central 0.92 1.22 0.89 1.10 1.05 1.21 0.85 1.17 
Western 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PPP adjusted 
 2002 2007 
Region urban rural migrant all urban rural migrant all 
Large municipalities 1.56 1.70 0.95 2.51 1.58 2.23 1.04 2.43 
Eastern 1.12 2.00 1.03 1.63 1.43 1.77 1.00 1.76 
Central 0.90 1.29 0.87 1.12 1.03 1.21 0.84 1.15 
Western 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note:  Income gaps are equal to the ratio of each region’s income per capita to that in 
the western region.  In this table long-term stable migrants are shown separately, and 
urban excludes migrants.  CHIP income definition; calculated using three-level 
weights for all and regional x provincial weights for the urban, rural, and migrant 
subgroups; current-year prices.  See notes to previous tables regarding PPP 
adjustments. 
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Table 2.12. Contributions of between-region inequality to overall inequality (%) 
         PPP unadjusted 
 2002 2007 
 urban rural migrant all urban rural migrant all 
GE(0) 19.4 20.7 7.8 17.6 18.0 16.9 7.3 15.5
GE(1) 20.5 20.0 7.6 19.9 17.6 17.2 6.5 17.1
         PPP adjusted 
 2002 2007 
 urban rural migrant all urban rural migrant all 
GE(0) 6.9 19.1 1.0 11.6 9.1 13.5 1.3 11.3
GE(1) 7.2 18.6 1.0 12.5 8.9 13.6 1.1 12.1
Note: The contributions of the differences in mean incomes among the four regions to 
national inequality are shown in the column titled “all.”  The other columns report 
the contributions of income differences between the four regions to inequality within 
the urban, rural, and migrant subgroups.  CHIP income definition; calculated using 
three-level weights for all and regional x provincial weights for the urban, rural and 
migrant subgroups; current-year prices.  
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Table 2.13. Gini coefficients by region, 2002 and 2007 
PPP unadjusted 
 2002 2007 
Large municipalities 0.321 0.315 
Eastern 0.418 0.456 
Central 0.398 0.428 
Western 0.456 0.471 
PPP adjusted 
 2002 2007 
Large municipalities 0.311 0.307 
Eastern 0.352 0.400 
Central 0.346 0.381 
Western 0.422 0.421 
Note: CHIP income definition; incomes are in current-year prices. Calculated using 
provincial and rural/urban weights.  Long-term, stable migrants are included in these 
calculations. 
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Table 2.14.  The urban-rural income gap by region, 2002 and 2007 
PPP unadjusted 
 2002 2007 
Large municipalities 3.08 2.34 
Eastern 2.58 3.44 
Central 2.81 3.32 
Western 3.73 3.85 
PPP adjusted 
 2002 2007 
Large municipalities 2.62 2.00 
Eastern 1.64 2.32 
Central 2.08 2.52 
Western 2.97 2.96 
Note: See notes to Table 2.13 and notes to previous tables regarding PPP adjustments. 
CHIP income definition. Migrants are included as urban residents in the calculations.     
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Table 2.15.  Poverty lines 
 official PPP$1.25/day
50% of 
median income 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 
Rural 964 1123 1451 1689 1051 1714 
Urban & migrants 1338 1503 2013 2260 3379 6412 
Note:   
1. The international PPP poverty threshold of $1.25 per day per person is 
converted to yuan using the PPP exchange rate of 3.46 yuan to the US dollar 
in 2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2008).   
2. We treat both the official poverty line and the PPP $1.25/day poverty line as 
rural poverty lines and convert them to 2002 and 2007 prices using the NBS 
rural consumer price index.  Urban absolute poverty lines are equal to the 
rural poverty lines adjusted by the urban-rural cost of living differential of 
1.3876 in 2002 and 1.3382 in 2007 (taken from Brandt and Holz [2006], and 
for 2007 updated using NBS consumer price indexes).  
3. The relative poverty lines are calculated separately for urban and rural.  
Median incomes for rural and urban (including migrants) are calculated 
using regional x provincial weights and the NBS income definition.   
4. All poverty lines are in current-year prices. 
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Table 2.16.  Poverty incidence and composition, 2002 and 2007 (%) 
 
Official  
poverty line PPP$1.25/day 
50% of median 
income 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 
Poverty incidence 
Rural 11.22 5.59 27.49 13.88 13.69 14.32 
Urban 0.55 0.12 2.34 0.44 11.88 12.37 
Migrants 2.43 0.08 5.80 0.17 18.57 7.00 
urban+migrants 0.68 0.12 2.58 0.42 12.34 11.98 
Total 7.44 3.20 18.57 8.00 13.21 13.30 
Poverty composition 
Rural 96.72 98.35 95.02 97.70 66.52 60.63 
Urban 2.48 1.57 4.21 2.23 30.01 37.73 
Migrants 0.80 0.08 0.77 0.07 3.47 1.64 
urban+migrants 3.28 1.65 4.98 2.30 33.48 39.37 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note:  Calculated using three-level weights for total and regional x provincial 
weights for subgroups.  NBS income definition; current year prices. 
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Table 2.17.  The structure of poverty by region (%) 
 Official poverty line PPP$1.25/day 50% of median income 
 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 
Poverty incidences 
Large municipalities 0.07 0.09 0.70 0.35 0.89 1.87 
Eastern 3.77 1.59 8.80 3.74 7.73 7.78 
Central 6.98 2.74 19.87 7.47 14.21 12.81 
Western 13.53 6.07 31.64 14.77 20.49 21.99 
Total 7.44 3.20 18.57 8.00 13.21 13.30 
Poverty composition 
Large municipalities 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.44 
Eastern 18.33 17.59 17.16 16.51 21.19 20.65 
Central 30.42 28.41 34.71 30.94 34.91 31.94 
Western 51.22 53.91 48.00 52.40 43.69 46.96 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Note: Calculated using three-level weights for total and regional x provincial weights 
for subgroups.  NBS income definition; current year prices.  A single relative 
poverty line calculated as 50 percent of the national median income is used for all 
regions. 
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1 These statistics are based on data published by the NBS. As discussed below, the 
NBS statistics yield somewhat different rates of growth in household income than the 
CHIP data. According to the NBS data, household per capita income in real terms 
increased 7.34 times for rural households and 7.53 times for urban households during 
the 1978-2007 period (National Bureau of Statistics 2008b).   
 
2 The total amount of agricultural subsidy funds, including grain subsidies, reached 
52.6 billion yuan in 2007; see “Nongyebu: Guojia jiang baochi zhi nonghui nong 
zhengce de wendingxing lianxuxing” (Ministry of Agriculture: The State Will 
Maintain Stable and Continuous Policy Support for Agriculture), September 13, 2007, 
at http://www.china.com.cn/news/2007-09/13/content_8869413.htm (accessed August 
22, 2011).  
 
3 See the introduction to the sampling procedure for the NBS household survey in 
2002 (NBS 2003, pp. 339-340).  
 
4 See the introduction to the sampling procedure for the NBS household survey in 
2007 (NBS 2008a, pp. 313-314).  
 
5 Note that Chongqing did not become a provincial-level municipality until 1997 and 
it is markedly less urbanized and less economically developed than China’s other 
provincial-level municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin).  Therefore, in this and 
other chapters, Chongqing is included as part of the western region. 
 
6 The geographic areas used to construct the CHIP sample frame are (1) large 
municipalities with provincial status (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, treated together 
as a separate geographic area [Chongqing is treated as part of Sichuan in western 
China for consistency with earlier rounds of the survey]), (2) eastern China (Hebei, 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan); central 
China (Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan); and 
western China (Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, 
Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang). 
 
7 Chapter 3 provides two alternative estimates of imputed rents, one in which all 
imputed rents are calculated using the rate of return approach, and the other in which 
urban imputed rents are calculated based on the market rent approach and rural 
imputed rents are based on the rate of return approach. The former approach shows 
higher urban incomes and more rapid growth in urban incomes as it is more sensitive 
to housing price appreciation in urban China. In this chapter we use the latter 
approach, which gives lower estimates of national inequality. Table 2A.2 provides 
comparisons of the results calculated using the two approaches. See Chapter 3 for 
additional discussion and comparisons between the two approaches. 
 
8 See China Statistical Yearbook 2008, at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexch.htm, accessed August 22, 2011. 
 
9  The Theil indices, like the Gini, have a minimum value of 0 and increase with 
inequality. G(0), sometimes referred to as the Mean Log Deviation (MLD), is more 
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sensitive to income differences at the low end of the income distribution. G(1), 
sometimes referred to as the Theil index, places equal weight on income differences 
across the income distribution. More information about the Theil measures of 
inequality can be found in Cowell (2011) and at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPA/Resources/tn_measuring_inequality.pdf 
and http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPGI/Resources/Inequality/litchfie.pdf, both 
accessed June 5, 2012.  
 
10  The Lorenz curve is a plot of the percentage of total income in society accruing to 
the bottom x percentage of the population. In the case of perfect equality (all members 
of the population have equal income), the Lorenz curve is coincident with the 45 
degree line. The farther the Lorenz curve is from the 45 degree line, the greater is the 
inequality. In the case of perfect inequality (one person has all the income and 
everyone else has zero income), the Lorenz curve is a right angle and coincides with 
the axis. The Gini is calculated as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and 
the 45 degree line to the total area under the 45 degree line. The minimum value of 
the Gini is zero, which occurs when there is perfect equality, and the maximum value 
is one, which occurs when there is perfect inequality. In practice the Gini for most 
countries generally falls between 0.2 and 0.7. See Cowell (2011) for a fuller 
discussion of inequality measurement. 
 
11 The alternative estimates are calculated as the rate of return times the estimated 
market value of housing. This yields values of imputed rents that are higher and that 
increased more rapidly than the base estimates, which are calculated using estimated 
market rents. The alternative estimates give higher contributions of urban imputed 
rents to overall inequality: 8.80 percent in 2002 and 17.45 percent in 2007. See 
Chapter 3 for further discussion. 
 
12 If the share of each income component had remained the same in 2002 and 2007, 
the inequality of total migrant income would have increased by 4 percent. The 
analysis in Chapter 6 in this volume, however, suggests that some of the change in the 
structure of migrant income was likely due to real economic factors, not merely a 
sample bias. 
 
13 The Gini coefficient is not decomposable by population subgroup. 
 
14 We also carried out the decomposition using alternative weights. The results are 
similar, so we do not report them here. 
 
15 Urban administrative areas in China often include not only urbanized districts but 
also farmland and rural populations, following the Mao-era practice of incorporating 
surrounding rural areas into city administration. See Chan (2010). 
 
16 The Gini coefficients for the other countries reported here are for 2005 and are 
measured over household income per capita. They are from the UNU-WIDER 
WIID2c database, at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/ , 
accessed August 12, 2011.  Note that the Ginis for Brazil and Honduras are the 
highest among all countries listed in this database for 2005-2006. 
